上海管理论坛第535期
题目：Love Well, Whip Well: A Competing View of Political Affinity Between Countries for ESG-Violating Firms（爱得深，罚得重：ESG违规企业之间国家政治亲和力的对立观点）
演讲人：夏军教授，德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Naveen Jindal商学院
主持人：于晓宇教授，beat365唯一官网管理学院
时间：2024年11月3日（周日），下午14:00
地点：beat365唯一官网校本部东区1号楼管理学院420会议室
主办单位：beat365唯一官网管理学院、上海企业创新与高质量发展研究中心（上海市软科学研究基地）、中国科学学与科技政策研究会企业创新与产业政策专委会、上海市行为科学学会、“数字创新管理与治理”重点创新团队
演讲人简介：
夏军教授任职于德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Naveen Jindal商学院，目前担任MOR高级主编，AMR、JIBS等期刊编委。夏军教授的研究集中于组织理论、公司战略、社会网络、国际商务等领域，已在Strategic Management Journal、Academy of Management Journal、Organization Science等国际高水平期刊发表数十篇研究成果。
演讲内容简介：
The prevailing literature on political affinity and multinational corporations’ (MNCs’) global operation commonly views political affinity as a protective shield, suggesting that the closer the relationship between the two countries, the greater the protection for MNCs. This perspective, however, is usually limited to the context of MNCs operating under normal conditions. This posits that political affinity may act as a double-edged sword in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) misconduct. While political affinity can provide an “insurance-like effect” by mobilizing home-country stakeholders to shield MNCs overseas, it may simultaneously provoke a “domestic-like penalty,” diminishing their inclination to offer protection and amplifying the reputational penalties for the offending firm. We further propose that shared language and bilateral commercial ties reinforce the domestic-like effects, intensifying the negative side of political affinity on the firm’s reputation. On the contrary, an MNC’s past ESG performance helps maintain domestic stakeholders’ confidence in the firm, intensifying the positive side of political affinity on reputational penalties. Using a sample of 9,153 ESG-violating incidents by 547 U.S. firms in different countries, our study unveils fresh insights into the double-edged sword role of political affinity.
本研究探讨了政治亲和力如何影响跨国公司（MNCs）因在东道国违反环境、社会和治理（ESG）标准而在母国遭受的声誉惩罚。基于期望违背理论，我们认为，母国与东道国之间的政治亲和力越强，母国利益相关者对公司在海外承担社会责任的期望也越高。因此，当ESG违规发生在政治上亲密的东道国时，母国利益相关者会表现出更大的失望情绪，从而导致更严重的声誉惩罚。我们还识别出三种关键情境因素——违规严重性、故意性和频繁性——它们通过加剧利益相关者的失望程度来放大政治亲和力对声誉惩罚的影响。通过分析涉及547家总部设在美国的跨国公司和9,153个ESG事件的数据，我们发现实证结果在很大程度上支持了这些假设。
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